The defence of Insanity under Indian Penal Code, 1860
The
defence of Insanity in criminal cases is to be found in section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860. This
section embodies a fundamental maxim of criminal jurisprudence, viz. that an
act does not constitute a crime unless it is done with a guilty intention. In
order to constitute a crime, the intent and the act must concur. The said
section[1]
fastens no culpability on insane persons because they can have no rational
thinking or the necessary guilty intent.
3.1
SEMANTIC SELECTION
Section 84 uses the expression “unsoundness
of mind” to include “insanity”, “madness” or “lunacy”. These terms are often
used synonymously (though the definition of each of these may differ in degree
and kind). The expression “unsoundness of mind” incorporates all kinds of
unsoundness of mind whether it is temporary or permanent, natural or
supervening, whether it arises from disease, or exists from the time of birth
(it is included in this expression). Thus, an idiot, a person non compos mentis
by sickness, a lunatic who had lucid intervals of reason, a person naturally
mad and/ or delirious and one whose reason is clouded by alcohol, all are
persons of “unsound mind”, are covered under the said section provided that
their unsoundness makes them oblivious to the nature and criminality of an act;
their unsoundness must be of the degree which the latter part of this section
requires.
3.2
TEST OF INSANITY
Section 84 embodies two mental
conditions, which exempt a man from responsibility for his wrongful act,
namely,
1) that
his unsoundness of mind was such that he was “ incapable of knowing the nature
of the act ,” or
2) That
it had precluded him from understanding that the act he was doing was wrongful.[2]
Of these the first seems to refer
to the offender’s consciousness of the bearing of his act on those who are
affected by it, the second to his consciousness of its relation to himself.
These two elements need not be simultaneously present in each case, nor indeed,
are they invariably so present. The absence of both or either relieves the
offender from liability to punishment. Situations like automatism, mistake and
simple ignorance such as can occur only in gross confusional state are covered
by the first category , whereas the second category embraces cases where mental
disease has only partially extinguished reason.
3.3 TEST
OF INSANITY DEVISED BY THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
The Calcutta High Court has tried
to formulate a third test in Ashiruddin
Ahmed v. The King[3] It was a case where the accused, according to
his version, in his dream was commanded by someone in paradise to sacrifice his
five year old son. On the next morning the accused took his son, to a nearly
mosque and killed him by the thrusting a knife in his throat. Then he went
straight to his uncle, but finding a village chowkidar nearby, took to the
uncle to a tank at some at some distance, and then narrated the whole story to
him. On trial, the accused retracted his confession but the evidence was not
seriously challenged. On these facts, the court laid down that in order to get
the benefit of section 84 the accused should establish any one of the
following three elements[4],
namely,
1. That the nature of the act was not known to the
accused
2. That the act was not known to him to be contrary
to law.
3. That the act was not known by him to be wrong
The
court held on evidence that the third element was established by the accused.
He believed that his dream was a reality; though he knew the nature of the act
and knew that, it was contrary to law .This was evident from his conduct of not
saying what he did in front of the chowkidar. According to the court, the
accused was clearly of unsound mind because acting under delusion of his
disease he made this sacrifice believing it to be right.
If this formulation of three exclusively independent
tests is accepted to be correct, it will lead to serious consequences, because
of the following reasons:
First:
An accused will be thus privileged to plead in every case that he had seen a
dream enjoining him to do certain criminal act and believing that his dream was
a command by a super natural power, he was impelled to translate the dream into
action, and he would thus be protected by Section 84. The court will have no
independent means of ascertaining the truth of the accused‘s statement. The defence of the insanity is likely to be
misused.
Second:
The court’s interpretation that “wrong” or “contrary to law” are two
interdependent tests runs counter to its earlier interpretation put forth in Geron Ali v. Emperor[5]
, where it found “wrong” or “contrary to law” as forming one test only. It is
observed that Mr. Justice Roxburg, a member of the division bench in both the
above cases, did not clarify the obviously conflicting decisions. A more
reasoned and elaborate judgment from the Calcutta High Court was expected
particularly in view of the fact that it represented a departure from its
earlier decision on the point.
Third:
According to Section 84, the accused should be “incapable” of knowing whether
the act “being done” by him is right or wrong. In a leading Allahabad case,
Justice Beg observed:
“The
capacity to know a thing is quite different from what a person knows. The
former is a potentiality the latter is the result of it. If a person possesses
the former, he cannot be protected in law, whatever might be the result of his
potentiality. In other words, what is protected is an inherent or organic
incapacity and not a wrong or erroneous belief which might be the result of a
perverted potentiality?[6]”
The beliefs of an accused can hardly protect him if
it is found that he possessed the capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong. If his potentialities lead him to a wrong conclusion, he takes the risk
and law will hold him responsible for his deeds. What the law protects is the
case of a man in whom the guiding light that enables a man to distinguish
between right and wrong and between legality and illegality is extinguished.
Where such a light is found to be still flickering, a man cannot be heard to
plead that he was led by his own intuition or by any fancied delusion which had
been haunting and which he took to be reality.
3.4 NATURE OF
UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND
The pertinent question here is that ‘What should be
the nature of unsoundness of mind in order to attract exemption?’ Every form of
the mental abnormality or derangement is not immune from criminal
responsibility. So is every mental aberration or deviation from normal conduct.
In order to get exemption from liability the insanity must be of a particular
and appropriate kind. The following factors are considered before exempting an
accused from the criminal liability on ground of insanity.
- DEGREE OF INSANITY
It
may be said that between the normal and the abnormal state of mind, there is
only difference of degree but not of kind. The mind may be unsound, if affected
by disease, disorderly or disturbed or abnormal. These factors must be of such
degree, which renders the accused incapable of knowing the nature of his act or
that what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. It should obliterate the
perceptional or volitional capacity.[7]
In Hazara
Singh v. State[8]
the Punjab and Haryana High Court said:
“In
order to earn immunity from criminal liability the disease, disorder or
disturbances of mind must of degree, which should obliterate perceptual or
volitional capacity. A person may be a fit subject for confinement in a mental
hospital, but that fact alone will not permit him to enjoy exemption from
punishment. Crotchetiness of cranks, feeble mindedness, any mental irresponsibility , mere frenzy ,
emotional imbalance , heat of passion , uncontrollable anger or jealously ,
fits of insensate hatred , or revenge , moral depravity , dethroning , reason ,
incurable perversions , hypersensitive excitability , ungovernable fits of
temper, stupidity , obtuseness, lack of
self-control, gross eccentricity and idiosyncrasy and other similar
manifestations, evidencing derangement of mental functions, by themselves, do not offer
relief from criminal responsibility”.
In State v.
Durgacharan Barik[9]
Justice S Barman said “ in order to
render a person irresponsible for crime on account of unsoundness of mind, the
unsoundness of mind should , accordingly
to the law as it has been long understand and held , be such as to render him
incapable of knowing right from wrong. The facts of each particular case must
of necessity present themselves with endless variety and with every shade of
difference in each case”.
In Barelal v.
State[10]
accused threw his own child aged 2 years over the wall as a result of which it
died. When his wife rose alarm and people arrived on the spot he tried to run
away with the body of the child. He had suspected the chastity of his wife and
legitimacy of the child. He had fits of insanity a couple of months back.
However, he was held guilty as it was proved that at the time of the commission
of the offence; he understood the nature of the act.
b.
IMPAIRMENT OF COGNITIVE FACULTIES
The cognitive faculties of mind are responsible for
human conduct. The cognitive faculties of the accused are considered in order
to exempt liability. In other words, exemption is available when the insanity
affects the faculty of understanding the significance of his act in its bearing
on the victims and in relation to the accused person’s own responsibility for
the act.
In Queen
Empress v. Kader Nasyer Shah[11] Fire destroyed the house and property of the
accused. This incident adversely affected him. He neglected his house, field
and family. He made frequent complaints of head ache. On the fateful day he
killed the boy he was very affectionate to without any sensible motive. He
observed some secrecy after the act. While setting aside the acquittal the
Court observed:
“It may be our law, like that of England,
limits non-liability only to those in which insanity affects the cognitive
faculties; because it is thought that those are the cases to which the
exemption rightly applies and the cases, in which insanity affects only the
emotions and the will, subjecting the offender to impulses, whilst it leaves
the cognitive faculties unimpaired, have been left outside the exception ….
Whether this is the proper view to take of the matter, or whether the exemption
ought to be extended as well to the cases in which insanity affects the
emotions and the will as to those in which it affects the cognitive faculties,
is a question which is not for us to consider… our duty is to administer the
law as we find it …. Where the will and emotions are affected by the offender
being subjected to insane impulses, it is difficult to say that his cognitive
faculties are not affected. In extreme cases that may be true; but we are not
prepared to accept the view as generally correct that a person is entitled to
exemption from criminal liability under our laws in cases in which it is only
shown that he is subject to insane impulses, notwithstanding that it may appear
clear that his cognitive faculties, so far as we can judge from his acts and
words, are left unimpaired”.
In Sarka
Gundusa v. State[12]
accused came out of his house brandishing an axe and gave a blow to a three old
boy playing outside, on his neck. The boy died instantaneously and the accused
ran away to the jungle close by and returned only the next day. Convicting the
accused Justice G.K Mishra said,
“Any and every type of insanity recognized in
medical science is not legal insanity. Every minor mental aberration is not
insanity. There can be no legal insanity unless the cognitive faculty of mind
is destroyed as a result of unsoundness of mind to such an extent as to render the accused incapable of knowing the nature
of the act or that what he is doing is
wrong or contrary to law.”
3.5
INSANITY MEDICAL AND LEGAL INSANITY
Every mentally diseased person is not ipso facto
exempted from criminal liability. This is so because according to the law, the
legal definition of insanity differs considerably from medical definition.
Medical insanity and Legal insanity differ in degree and standards. From the
medical points of view, it is probably correct to say that every man at the
time of the committing the criminal act is insane. He is insane in the sense
that he is not in a sound, healthy and normal condition and therefore needs a
treatment .But from the legal point of view, so long as he is able to
distinguish between right and wrong and to know that the act done by him is
wrong or contrary to law, he must be presumed to be sane. There are following
factors which will help in distinguishing between legal and medical insanity
(A)
DIFFERENCE IN DEGREE
In medical parlance, ‘unsoundness of mind’ would
admit a variety of conditions of varying degree of severity. It is said that
these conditions manifest far too many characteristics to justify any precise
definition applicable to all cases. For the sake of precision and certainty,
law exempts from criminal responsibility only that ‘unsoundness of mind’ which
materially affects the cognitive faculties of mind. Persons whom medical
science would pronounce as insane do not necessarily take leave of their
emotions and feelings like fear, frustration, ambition and revenge. Fear and threat may have a deterrent
influence on them. Insane person, in one
sense, would refrain from committing any acts of violence or mischief if more powerful
men are present at the scene. One is insane in legal sense only if one could
have still yielded to his insanity in such circumstances and one is not aware
of one’s act and its consequences. The degree of unsoundness of mind for legal
insanity is higher than that of medical insanity.
(B)TIME FACTOR
In the case of legal insanity, the mental condition
referred to it in the Indian Penal Code must be established to have existed at
the time when the act was committed. If a man is found to be insane before or
after the commission of the offence it raises no presumption that he was of
sound mind at the time of the commission of offence. The state of mind of the
accused before or after the crucial time of commission of the offence may
become relevant to the fact that the accused was in such a state of mind as to
be entitled to exemption, could be established from circumstances which
preceded, attended and followed the time of commission of the act. Unsoundness
of mind of an accused at the time other than the time of commission is only
relevant to prove the state of the mind of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, whereas, to medical insanity, that may be
determinative in the sense that a man may be medically insane at anytime.
(C) PROOF OF LEGAL INSANITY
For the purpose
of legal insanity the degree of proof required is also greater than that
required for proving medical insanity. A
Court will look for some clear and distinct proof of mental delusion or
intellectual aberration existing immediately before, or at the time of, or
immediately after the perpetration of the offence. Medical practitioners
recognize that there may be delusion or aberration, springing up in the mind
suddenly, and not revealed by the previous conduct or conversation of the
accused .Thus, the criteria deployed by the medical practitioner to detect
insanity are different from those employed by the Courts.
The fact that
the person was conscious of the criminality of the act is immaterial for
establishing medical insanity. The legal criteria for the existence of insanity
are the act of the person and his consciousness of its criminality. To a lawyer
insanity is ‘conduct of a certain character’ whereas to a physician it means ‘a
certain disease one of the effects of which is to produce such a conduct’. To
men of medicine and psychiatry as to men of law motive is not decisive in
determining insanity.
Queen Empress v. Lakshman Dagdu[13]
is case illustrative of the tests employed by law fraternity and medical
practitioner to establish legal insanity and medical insanity. In this case,
the accused brutally killed two of his young children. The accused was down
with fever. The crying of the children annoyed him. The fever had made him
irritable and sensitive to sound. It did not appear that he was delirious at
the relevant time. True there was no attempt at concealment. The accused showed
no signs of sorrow or remorse. He had no previous symptoms of insanity. Taking
the circumstances into account, the Court held him guilty of murder because the
accused was conscious of the nature of his act, and so he must be presumed to
have conscious of criminality also.
Observed from the medical point of view, there was
no premeditation. The idea occurred to the accused suddenly. There was no
precaution taken, no concealment or attempt to escape, no sorrow, or remorse,
and the act was done without the aid of an accomplice. The court had conceded
that if the case had to be decided by medical tests, the accused would have to
be acquitted.
In Kalicharan
v. Emperor [14]the
appellant, who had some ill feeling towards his wife struck four persons to
death including, his wife, a boy and a two months old kid. He also injured two
other persons in an atrocious manner. On one of his victims, he inflicted not
less than 13 injuries. He used three weapons altogether to commit these multiple
murders. In the trial court he said he remembered striking only his first two
victims his wife and his brother- in- law’s son. He did not take the plea of
insanity in the trial court. No family history was disclosed therein. Such a
plea was taken in the High Court for the first time. The High Court observed
that a criminal is not excused for his own atrocity. The Court has to look
outside the act itself for evidences. Since these factors were against the
accused he was held guilty of the crime charged. Distinguishing between ‘legal’
and ‘medical insanity’ the court pointed out that exemption is applicable only
to the former cases where the cognitive faculties of the accused are completely
impaired making the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that
he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law. It could not be extended to cases
where the accused acts without any motive and under sudden and overpowering
impulse.
In State of
Kerala v. Ravi [15]
accused was madly in love with the deceased girl aged 15 years. She belonged to
a different community therefore, the girl’s family objected to the same. The
dream of the accused for the marriage could not materialize. Out of despair,
the accused stabbed the girl several times and killed her. His defence that it
was in a fit of impulsive insanity that he killed her. It was such an
irresistible impulse according to him, that he was so out of his power of
self-control as not to know the nature of the act or that he was doing what was
wrong or contrary to law. The plea was allowed by the trial court .On appeal,
the High Court held him guilty observing that there can be no legal insanity
unless the cognitive faculties of the mind are, as a result of unsoundness of
mind, so completely impaired as to render the offender incapable of knowing the
nature of the act or that he was doing what was either or wrong contrary to
law. The character or enormity of the offence, manner of attack, absence of
concealment or escape or the mere lack of motive will not in itself be
conclusive of legal insanity.
Pancha v.
Emperor[16]
is a case of murder on a day of lunar eclipse. There was darkness all around.
The accused attacked the victim with lathi who was sleeping on a char payee in
front of his house. Several blows fell on the victim’s head near and above the
left eyebrow and fractured his skull completely resulting in his instantaneous
death. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused. The judge pointed out that the
accused selected an opportunity and time for attack as all the blows were aimed
at the head indicating deliberation and that he ran away as soon as alarm was
raised. This showed that he was capable of understanding the nature and
consequence of the act. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court.
Distinguishing between ‘legal’ and ‘medical insanity’ the court observed:
“According
to medical sciences insanity is another name for mental abnormality due to
various causes and existing in various degrees. Even an uncontrollable impulse
driving to kill or wound comes within the scope. But a man whom the mental
science would pronounce as insane does not necessarily take leave of his
emotions and feelings. Hope, ambition, revenge, etc., may still govern his
mind. Fear may have exercised its influence over him, and threats may have a
deterrent effect”.
In Kesheorao,
v. State of Maharashtra[17]
is a case where the appellant attempted to murder his daughter-in-law by
inflicting not less than 16 injuries. He did it with a spear blade while nobody
else was there in the house where he was living separately from the family of
his son. Distinguishing between medical and legal tests of insanity the court
held the appellant guilty. The court said that eccentricity or strange behavior
or mental disorder not amounting to insanity as known to the law, would not
absolve a person from the consequences of his act. The mere fact that on
earlier occasions, a person had been subject to insane delusions or had
suffered from derangement of the mind or had subsequently at times behaved like
a mentally deficient person, is per se not sufficient to bring his case with in
the exemption .The antecedent conduct and subsequent conduct of such a persons
are relevant to show the state of his mind at the time of the act, but not
conclusive evidence of legal insanity.
3.6 PROVISIONS REGARDING EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF
PROVING INSANITY
With respect to a psychiatrist’s evidence on
insanity of the respondent, it is clear that the psychiatrist is treated as an
expert witness. Section 45[18]
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 clearly applies to any evidence given by a
psychiatrist. Illustration (b) to Section 45 of the Act makes the position
crystal clear as to evidence given by a psychiatrist. And, for once,
M’Naghten’s Rules come to the aid of the “medical practitioner conversant in
the disease of insanity”. Lord Chief Justice Tindall has clearly marked the
boundaries of a psychiatrist’s testimony and evidence that can be given by the
medical practitioner, in his clear answer to the fifth query[19]
in the M’Naghten Case.
In India, it is upon the prosecution to prove beyond
all reasonable doubt, both the mens rea and the actus reus constituting the
normal crime. However, since Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 falls
under Chapter IV of the Code comprising of General Exceptions, we can here
usefully refer to the authoritative statement of law regarding the burden of
proof in an insanity defence in Dayabhai
Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat[20]
where it was held as follows: “It is a fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the
burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide, shall
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death with the
requisite intention described in Section 299[21]
of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and always rests on
the prosecution.”
The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of
insanity may be stated in the following propositions:
·
the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with
the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always lies on the
prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial;
·
there is a rebuttable
presumption that the accused was not insane when he committed the crime, in the
sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the accused may rebut
it by placing by placing before the court the relevant evidence – oral, documentary
or circumstantial, but the burden of proof that rests on him is no higher than
that rests upon a party to civil proceedings;
·
even if the accused is
not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time of committing
the offence, the evidence placed by the prosecution may raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more ingredients of the
offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case, the court would be
entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden that rests
on the prosecution was not discharged.
However, at the functional level, the burden is still heavy and “proves
a hard nut to crack” for the mentally disabled or disordered.
3.7 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
AND SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
ACT, 1987.
In Amrit
Bhushan Gupta v. Union of India[22],
a Bench of three judges of the Apex Court has held that “our statute law on the
subject is based entirely on secular considerations which place the protection
and welfare of society in the forefront. What the statute law does not prohibit
or enjoin cannot be enforced. The question whether, on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, a convict, alleged to have become insane,
appears to be so dangerous that he must not be let loose on society, lest he
commits similar crimes against other persons when released, or, because of his
antecedents and character or for some other reason, he deserves a different
treatment, are matters for other authorities to consider after a court has duly
passed its sentence. Similarly, one of
the objects and reasons of the Mental Health Act, 1987 lays down the following:
The attitude of society towards persons afflicted with mental illness has
changed considerably and it is now realized that no stigma should be attached
to such illness as it is curable, particularly when diagnosed at an early
stage. Thus, the mentally ill persons are to be treated like any other sick
person and the environment around them should be made as normal as possible.
The experience of the working of the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912, has revealed that
it has become outmoded. With the rapid advancement of medical science and the
understanding of the nature of the malady, it has become necessary to have a
fresh legislation with provisions for the treatment of mentally ill persons in
accordance with the new approach.”
In Jaishankar v. State,[23]
it has been held that the Court is bound to enquire and determine if the
accused is of unsound mind and if so, can he plead his defence. This provision will come into play if the
Magistrate has reason to believe, as a reasonable person, that the accused may
be of unsound mind. This procedure and enquiry are mandatory and should be
completed at the preliminary stage of the trial and failure to do so will
vitiate the entire proceedings. Chapter
XXV[24]
of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the procedure of cases wherein the
accused is insane. Section 335[25]
of the Criminal Procedure Code is a mandatory provision and is a safety valve
for the society at large and the accused himself. Section 27[26]
of the Mental Health Act, 1987 deals with mentally ill prisoners and is the
corresponding provision to Section 3[27]
of the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 which defined “criminal lunatic” and applies to
proceedings under Section 335 of the Criminal Procedure Code. For example, in Krishnan Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
the Court held that the act of the accused was sudden and medical evidence
proved that he suffered from chronic schizophrenia; it was held that he was
eligible to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. The Division
Bench set aside the conviction but ruled that keeping in view his conduct,
behavior and medical records; he could not be set free as he would pose a
danger to the public. Directions were
passed to shift the accused to a mental hospital.
[1] Two minor differences in section
84 and answers 2 and 3 of the M’Naghten Rules may be noticed. These rules refer
to the “nature and quality” of the act, whereas section 84 does not use the
word “quality”. Likewise, the expression “contrary to law” appearing in section
84 is not in the M’Naghten Rules. These distinctions are , however , of little
consequence, for
(1)
there
is no distinction between the two words ,” nature and quality”: both refer to
the physical character of the act (R v
Codere (1916) 12Crim.App.R.21) , and
(2)
“wrong”,
has been held to be include and even to mean, “wrong in law”. If the accused
knows that the act was morally wrong, knowledge as to the illegality of the act
will follow because knowledge of law is presumed (R v Windle (1952) 2 Q.B
826.)
[2] Pancha v Emperor AIR 1932 All.
233., Rustam Ali v State AIR 1960 All. 333.; Karma Urang v. Emperor AIR 1928
Cal 238.; Bazlur Rahman v. Emperor AIR 1928 Cal 1
[3] AIR 1949 Cal 182.
[4] Kanbi Kurja v. State AIR
1960 Guj. 1 has also approved three test theory. The accused considered himself
to be a pure –blooded Suryavanshi and Arjuna of the Mahabharat and regarded his
wife Jamna as Bhangdi, and his eldest son Natha as Karna , the inveterate enemy
of Arjuna. Suffering from these delusions and hallucinations, the accused
killed his wife Jamna and his son Natha believing that Natha was Karna and he
being Arjuna there would be nothing wrong in causing the death of his
inveterate enemy Karna. Likewise, he did not consider killing his wife Jamna as
anything wrong, as he was suffering from a delusion and hallucination that she
was a woman who had given birth to an illegitimate son and was therefore
contemptible and regarded her and in fact called her Bhangdi. Immediately after
killing them, he openly told the Sar Panch addressing the latter as Bhisma
Pitamaha, again a famous and significant name in the Mahabharat, that he had
killed Bhangdi, meaning his wife, and Karna meaning his son. There was a
complete lack of motive in this brutal act of killing his own wife and son with
whom the accused had not been on any hostile or unfriendly terms. He indicated
neither repentance nor remorse over his conduct. On the contrary, he openly
boasted, in the presence of many, that he had caused the death of his wife and
his son and, even after this proclamation, made no attempt to abscond from the
village or to conceal the incriminating item of evidence. Evidence disclosed
the eccentric and unusual behaviour on his part. The cumulative effect of all
these circumstances clearly indicated that the accused was suffering from the
infirmity of mind, by reason of his being subject to the aforesaid
hallucination, in consequence of which he was not in a position to realize that
what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.
[5] - AIR 1941 Cal.
[6] Lakshmi v State AIR 1959
All 534.
[7] G Sadasivan Nair “Defence of
Insanity: Need for Reform” 12 Cochin University
[8] AIR 1958 Punj 104.
[9] AIR 1963 Ori 33.
[10] AIR 1960 M.P 102.
[11] (1896) 23 ILR Cal.
[12] AIR 1969 Ori 102.
[13] (1886) 10 ILR .Bom. 512.
[14] AIR 1948 Nag 20.
[15] 1978 KLT. 177.
[16] AIR 1932 All. 233.
[17]
1979 Cri.LJ. 403.
[18]
Section 45: Opinions of experts.—When the Court has to
form an opinion upon a point of foreign law or of science or art, or as to
identity of handwriting [or
finger impressions], the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled
in such foreign law, science or art, [or
in questions as to identity of handwriting] [or
finger impressions] are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts.
[19]
5th Rule: Where the Criminal act is committed by a man
under some insane delusion as to the surrounding facts, which conceals from him
the true nature of the act he was doing, he will be under the same degree of
responsibility as he would have been on the fact as he imagined them to be.
[20] AIR 1964 SC 1563
[21] Section 299: Culpable homicide.—Whoever causes death by
doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he
is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
[23] AIR 1972 SC 2267
[24] Chapter XXV: Provisions As To Accused Persons Of Unsound
Mind
[25] Section 335: Whenever the finding states that the
accused person committed the act alleged, the magistrate or Court before whom
or which the trial has been held shall, if such act would, but for the
incapacity found have constituted an offence
[26]
Section 27: Admission and detention of mentally ill
prisoner.—An order under section 30 of the Prisoners Act, 1900 (3 of 1900) or
under section 144 of the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or under section 145
of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or under section 143 or section 144 of the
Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957), or under section 330 or section 335 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), directing the reception of a mentally ill
prisoner into any psychiatric hospital or psychiatric nursing home, shall be
sufficient authority for the admission of such person in such hospital or, as
the case may be, such nursing home or any other psychiatric hospital or
psychiatric nursing home to which such person may be lawfully transferred for
detention therein.
[27]
"Criminal
lunatic" means any person for whose detention in, or removal to an asylum,
jail or other place of safe custody, an order has been made in accordance with
the provisions of section 330 or sections 335 and 336 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 or of section 30 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, or of section 103A
of the Indian Army Act, 1911;
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